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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory 
of moral reasoning. The purpose of the research was to 
investigate the relationship between role-taking ability and 
the movement from a preconventional to conventional level of 
moral reasoning. In order for children to move from 
preconventional (stage 2) to conventional (stage 3) moral 
reasoning, it was hypothesized that they must be able to 
view an interaction from a third-person perspective 
(reciprocal role taking). It was further hypothesized that 
along with this type of role-taking ability the 
preconventional moral reasoner would need a sufficient 
degree of affective development (high in the need for 
affiliation) in order to make the shift to conventional 
moral reasoning.
Sixty-two fourth grade children were assessed on 
(1) stage of moral reasoning, (2) role-taking development,
(3) Ability to assimilate stage 3 moral reasoning and
(4) affiliation and security needs. Forty-six children were 
assessed as stage 2 moral reasoners. Twenty-six of the 
stage two reasoners were assessed as reciprocal role takers. 
Twenty-two of the twenty-six reciprocal role-takers 
assimilated stage 3 moral reasoning while only seven of the 
twenty non-reciprocal role takers assimilated higher 
reasoning (X = 11.944, df = 1, p < .001). Establishing a 
relationship between the children's affective needs and 
stage 3 assimilation was unsuccessful.
Results were discussed in terms of their implications 
for intervention programs and future moral development 
research.
AN INVESTIGATION OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE PREREQUISITES 
FOR CONVENTIONAL MORAL REASONING
INTRODUCTION
Individual differences in ideas and attitudes about 
justice, right and wrong, and the nature of the conscience 
have been subject to a vast amount of research and thought 
during the first half of this century (Baldwin, 1906; 
Hartshorne and May, 1930; Dewey and Tufts, 1932; Piaget, 
1932). Although in recent years Piaget did little work in 
the area of moral judgment, his earlier work (1932) provided 
a starting point for a number of subsequent theorists and 
investigators. Piaget studied moral judgment by observing 
childrens' responses to stories and the way children play 
games with each other (understanding of the rules). He also 
directly questioned children about good and bad actions, 
duties and punishment. On the basis of these observations, 
Piaget conceptualized two broad stages of moral development 
- heteronomous and autonomous.
Heteronomous implies that one is subject to the rule or 
law of another. This is the earliest form of morality and 
it is derived from a respect for the parents, which is at 
first dependent on the presence of the parents but gradually 
becomes internalized. Heteronomous morality is 
characterized by obedience to authority for its own sake.
2
3The heteronomous preoperational child will connect "badness" 
to "bigness" in a literal sense - the child will primarily 
focus on the physical consequences (large or small) of an 
act instead of the intentions (good or bad). A progression 
from preoperational through concrete operational thought 
coincides with the rise of autonomous moral thought. 
Autnomous implies that one is subject to one's own rules or 
laws. In this stage morality is based on mutual respect and 
punishments begin to be understood in the context of 
intentions and motives.
Piaget's description of the development of moral 
reasoning from heteronomy to autonomy was an important 
contribution and it provided both methods and concepts for 
later researchers. Importantly, Piaget gave developmental 
psychologists a perspective - to see the world through the 
eyes of the child. Although his work is critical, Piaget's 
account of moral reasoning was inadequate in the sense that 
it did not allow for more complex and developmentally 
advanced levels.
More recently Lawrence Kohlberg (1958; 1969; 1976) has 
investigated extensively the development of 75 boys at 
three-year intervals from early adolescence through manhood, 
supplemented by a series of studies on moral development in 
other cultures. Through these studies and the influence of 
Piaget's studies on moral and cognitive development in 
children, Kohlberg has hypothesized three levels of moral 
thinking - preconventional, conventional, and
4postconventional. He further postulates that each level
contains two related stages of moral development. Table 1
contains a summary of the six hypothesized stages.
Kohlberg defined these stages by recording responses to
hypothetical moral dilemmas. The dilemmas involve moral
issues found in all countries (punishment, justice, life,
property, truth). The "Heinz" story is a classic example of
the type of dilemma administered:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special 
kind of cancer. There was a drug that doctors 
thought might save her. It was a form of radium 
that a druggist in the same town had recently 
discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but 
the druggist was charging ten times what the drug 
cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and 
charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The 
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he 
knew to borrow the money, but he could get 
together only about $1,000 which is half of what 
it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was 
dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him 
pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I 
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money 
from it." So, Heinz got desperate and broke into 
the store to steal the drug for his wife.
Kohlberg views the six stages as forming a "universally
invariant developmental sequence" in which the attainment of
an advanced stage is dependent on each of the preceding
stages. Extending this assumption, Kohlberg maintained that
a more advanced stage is not simply an addition to a less
advanced stage, but represents a reorganization of less
advanced levels. His postulations do not imply any
particular rate of progress or the eventual attainment of
stage six, but if children progress they must do so in
accordance with these stages. Examples of such a stepwise
TABLE 1
DEFINITION OF KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT*
I. Preconventional level
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels 
of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of 
either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, 
reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those 
who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the followin 
two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of 
the human meaning or value of those consequences. Avoidance of punishment 
and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in 
terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and 
authority (the latter being stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action
consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and 
occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms 
Like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, 
and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a 
physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back 
and I'll scratch yours", not of loyalty, gratitude or justice.
II. Conventional level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's 
family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, 
regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not 
only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of 
loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the 
order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At 
this level, there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance of "good boy - nice girl"
orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is 
approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what 
is majority of "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by 
intention - "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One 
earns approval by being "nice".
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. 
Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, 
and maintaining the given social order for it's own sake.
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level.
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral value and
6(Table 1— continued)
principles which have validity and application apart from the authority 
of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the 
individual's own identification with these groups. The level again has 
two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms 
of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically 
examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness 
of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding 
emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what 
is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter 
of personal "values" and "opinion". The result is an emphasis upon the 
"legal point of view", but with an emphasis upon the possibility of 
changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility 
(rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside 
the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of 
obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government 
and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical 
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and 
consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, 
the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the 
Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, 
of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the 
dignity of human beings as individual persons.
’■Source: Kohlberg and Turiel, 1973
7movement through the conceptions of the moral worth of human 
life ("Heinz” dilemma) are provided in Table 2.
Furthermore, Kohlberg defines each stage as a total way 
of thinking, not just a set of attitudes toward particular 
situations. Accordingly, a stage is a way of thinking which 
may be used to support either side of an action choice. A 
stage implies "qualitative differences in mode of response . 
rather than quantitative increases in information or in 
strength of response" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 169).
For more than a decade, Kohlberg and his colleagues 
have advanced empirical evidence supporting his theory of 
moral development. Kohlberg attempted to document the 
universality of his stages by testing the moral reasoning of 
people from villages and cities in the United States, Great 
Britain, Taiwan, Israel, Yucatan, and Turkey (Kohlberg,
1969). In all of these cultures he found evidence of the 
same basic six stages through which moral values and 
judgments progress (however, the evidence for universality 
of moral reasoning stages is more convincing for the lower 
stages). Turiel (1966) investigated the postulation that 
Kohlberg's stages form an invariant sequence by testing the 
implication that any movement to a moral stage differing 
from the person's own should be directed at the next stage. 
In his experiment, subjects were given a pretest to 
determine their level of moral reasoning. The subjects were 
then exposed to moral judgments either one or two stages 
above or one below their determined stage. Turiel found
8TABLE 2
SIX STAGES IN THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE MORAL WORTH OF LIFE*
Stage 1: No differentiation between moral value of life and its
physical or social status value.
Tommy, age LO (Why should the druggist give the drug to the 
dying woman when her husband couldn't pay for it?): "If someone important
is in a plane and is allergic to heights and the stewardess won't give 
him medicine because she's only got enough for one and she's got a sick 
one, a friend, in back, they'd probably put the stewardess in a lady's 
jail because she didn't help the important one."
(Is it better to save the life of one important person or a lot of 
unimportant people?): "All the people that aren't important because one 
man just has one house, maybe a lot of furniture, but a whole bunch of 
people have an awful lot of furniture and some of these poor people might 
have a lot of money and it doesn't look it."
Stage 2: The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the
satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons. Decision 
to save life is relative to, or to be made by, its possessor. (Differen­
tiation of physical and interest value of life, differentiation of its 
value to self and to other.)
Tommy, age thirteen (Should the doctor "mercy kill" a fatally ill 
woman requesting death because of her pain?): "Maybe it would be good
to put her out of her pain, she'd be better off that way. But the husband 
wouldn't want it, it's not like an animal. If a pet dies you can get 
along without it— it isn't something you really need. Well, you can get 
a new wife, but it's not really the same."
Jim, age thirteen (same question): "If she requests it, it's really
up to her. She is in such terrible pain, just the same as people are 
always putting animals out of their pain."
Stage 3: The value of a human life is based on the empathy and
affection of family members and others toward its possessor. (The value
of human life, as based on social sharing, community, and love is 
differentiated from the instrumental and hedonistic value of life applicable 
also to animals.)
Tommy, age sixteen (same question): "It might be best for her, but
her husband— it's a human life— not like an animal, it just doesn't have 
the same relationship that a human being does to a family. You can become 
attached to a dog, but nothing like a human you know."
Stage 4: Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a
categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties. (The value of
human life, as a categorical member of a moral order, is differentiated
from its value to specific other people in the family, etc. Value of
life is still partly dependent upon serving the group, the state, God, 
however).
9(Table 2— continued)
Jim, age sixteen (same question): "I don't know. In one way, 
it's murder, it's not a right or privilege of man to decide who shall 
live and who should die. God put life into everybody on earth and you're 
taking away something from that person that came directly from God, and 
you're destroying something that is very sacred, it's in a way part of 
God and it's almost destroying a part of God when you kill a person.
There's something of God in everyone."
Stage 5: Life is valued both in terms of its relation to community
welfare and in terms of being a universal human right. (Obligation to 
respect the basic right to life is differentiated from generalized respect 
for the socio-moral order. The general value of the independent human life 
is a primary autonomous value not dependent upon other values.)
Jim, age twenty (same question): "Given the ethics of the doctor
who lias taken on responsibility to save human life— from that point of 
view he probably shouldn't but there is another side, there are more and 
more people in the medical profession who are thinking it is a hardship 
on everyone, the person, the family, when you know they are going to die. 
When a person is kept alive by an artificial lung or kidney, it's more 
like being a vegetable than being a human who is alive. If it's her own 
choice, I think there are certain rights and privileges that go along with 
being a human being. I am a human being and have certain desires for 
life and T think everybody else does, too. You have a world of which 
you are the center, and everybody else does, too, and in that sense we're 
all equal".
Stage 6: Belief in the sacredness of human life as representing a
universal human value of respect for the individual. (The moral value of 
a human being, as an object of moral principle, is differentiated from a 
formal recognition of his rights).
J im, age twenty-four (Should the husband steal the drug to save his 
wife? How about for someone he just knows?): "Yes. A human life takes
precedence over any other moral or legal value, whoever it is. A human 
life has inherent value whether or not it is valued by a particular 
individual."
(Why is that?): "The inherent worth of the individual human being 
is the central value in a set of values where the principles of justice 
and love are normative for all human relationships."
"'Source: Kohlberg, 1971
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that subjects exposed to reasoning directly above their own 
stage were influenced more than those exposed to stages 
further above their own. Turiel had hypothesized that if 
the acquisition of each stage is not simply an addition 
process but a reorganization of the preceding stages, then 
the subjects should resist lower stages. In support of this 
hypothesis, the results indicated that the children exposed 
to moral judgments one stage above their own assimilated 
more than did either of the other groups. When asked in a
post test to present their own advice on the moral
situations, the children exposed to the stage directly above 
their own used more reasoning at the stage to which they 
were exposed than did the other two groups.
Turiel, Rest, and Kohlberg (1969) extended the Turiel
study by investigating preference, comprehension and 
assimilation of the moral stages. In their study they 
proposed the following three hypotheses:
1) Stages of thinking above subject's predominant 
stage would be preferred to those below his stage 
if the subjects were asked to choose among them.
2) Stages of thinking above a subject's 
predominant stage are increasingly more difficult 
for the subject to understand than are the stages 
below his own level and hence cannot be correctly 
reproduced as readily as lower stages.
3) These two principles - preference for more 
advanced stages and increasing cognitive 
difficulty - interact such that subjects maximally 
accept into their own thinking moral reasoning one 
stage above their dominant stage (p. 22 7).
To test these hypotheses, the subjects were exposed to
moral advice at stages one above, two above, and one below
11
their own. Measures of preference, comprehension, and 
assimilation were then obtained. The results confirmed the 
original hypotheses: subjects strongly preferred the plus
two stage advice over the minus one and on the subsequent 
post test, subjects were generally found to be at a plus one 
level of functioning. The findings of this study indicate 
that the assimilation effect demonstrated in the Turiel 
study was due to rejection of lower level messages, which 
were comprehended, and to noncomprehension of' the plus two 
stage message, which were liked.
Kohlberg has openly accepted philosophy as essential to 
his or any study of moral development. He adamantly states 
that "the fact that the cognitive categories of the 
philosopher are central for understanding the behavior 
development of the child is so apparent, once pointed out, 
that one recognizes that it is only the peculiar 
epistemology of the positivist behaviorist which could have 
obscured it" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 152). Kohlberg has 
exhaustively argued that it is logically possible to move 
from his description of what moral stage development i_s to a 
statement of what such development ought to be. This 
argument directly implies that persons at a higher level of 
moral development reason better and act in accordance with 
their judgment. Empirical findings do support the 
contention that principled individuals act more honestly and 
live up to their beliefs when confronted by inconvenience 
and authority more so than individuals at lower stages of
12
moral development (Krebs, 1967; Kohlberg, Scharf, and
Hickey, 1972). The relationship between moral reasoning and
moral behavior is, however, a very controversial area.
There are just as many or more studies that have found no
relationship between stages of moral reasoning and moral
behavior (for a comprehensive review see Blasi, 1980).
On the basis of his "is to ought" contention, the
properties of the individual moral stages and research
(Turiel, 1966? Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg, 1969? Rest, 1973)
Kohlberg (1973) has developed and instrumental approach to
the area of value education. The basic goal of this
approach is the stimulation of development stepwise through
the moral stages. Recounting the limitations of early
"indoctrination" approaches to moral education, Kohlberg
introduces his approach:
Assuming that moral development passes through a 
natural sequence of stages, the approach defines 
the aim of moral education as the stimulation of 
the next step of development rather than 
indoctrination into the fixed conventions of the 
school, the church, or the nation. It assumes 
that the movement to the next step of development 
rests not only on exposure to the next level of 
thought, but to experiences of conflict in the 
application of the child's current level of 
thought to problematic situations. In contrast to 
conventional moral education, then, the approach 
stresses:
1) Arousal of genuine moral conflict, 
uncertainty, and disagreement about genuinely 
problematic situations. (In contrast, 
conventional moral education has stressed adult 
"right answers," and reinforcement of the belief 
that virtue is always rewarded."
2) The presentation of modes of thought one 
stage above child's own. (In contrast, 
conventional moral education tends to shift 
between appeals to adult abstractions far above 
the child's level and appeals to punishment and
13
prudence liable to rejection because they are 
above the child's level). (Blatt and Kohlberg,
1973, p. 6).
An example of the application of these principles to the 
classroom is provided by a study conducted by Blatt and 
Kohlberg (1973). Initially they tested all the children in 
the class for their stage of moral reasoning. During a 
twelve-week program, the members of the class discussed and 
argued a series of moral dilemmas different from those used 
in the pretest. In the course of these discussions among 
students, the teacher supported and clarified those 
arguments which were one stage above the majority of the 
children. At the end of the twelve weeks, all of the 
children were retested in order to assess the immediate 
effects of the discussion. A majority of the children in 
the class were found to have moved ahead almost one full 
stage. The classroom experience of moral education had led 
to a significant increase in moral judgment as compared to 
the control groups, and that this increase was still evident 
one year later.
The progress of moral development is by no means 
autonomous from other developmental processes. Intelligence 
relates strongly to moral judgment and behavior (Kohlberg, 
1973). Also Piaget's stage sequence of cognitive 
development seems to closely parallel that of Kohlberg's. 
Kohlberg (1971) states that "it is logically necessary that 
the two stages (cognitive and moral) be isomorphic" (p.
186). He argues, however, that the isomorphism of cognitive
14
and moral stages does not mean that moral judgment is simply
the application of a level of intelligence to moral
problems. Kohlberg (1971) contends that:
Moral development is its own sequential process, 
rather than the reflection of cognitive 
development in a slightly different content area.
A child deprived of all moral social stimulation 
until adolescence might perhaps develop principled 
or formal operational, logical thought in 
adolescence, but would still have to go through 
all the stages of morality before developing moral 
principles, rather than automatically reflecting 
his cognitive principles in a morally principled 
form of thought. While moral stages are not 
simply special application of logical stages, 
logical states must be prior to moral stages.
(p. 187)
Recent research (Lee, 1971; Colby, 1975;
Tomlinson-Keasy, 1974; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, and Haan, 
1977) has supported Kohlberg's contention of a general 
correlation between the stages of the two developmental 
sequences. The Piagetian cognitive stages appear to be 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
corresponding moral stages. Specifically, the attainment of 
concrete operations seems to be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the movement to stage 2 moral 
judgment; a similar relationship seems to exist for formal 
operations and stage 5. This specific dependent model is 
based on correlational studies in which subjects were tested 
on their stages of Piagetian reasoning and moral reasoning. 
For example, all subjects at moral reasoning stages 2 and 5 
passed the parallel Piagetian stage cognitive task, but not 
all subjects at the concrete and formal operational stages 
passed the equivalent moral task.
15
Recently a number of investigations (Stuart, 1967;
Moir, 19 74; Ambron and Irwin, 1974; Selman, 1971a, 1971b,
1975; Selman and Byrne, 1974; Selman and Damon, 1975; for
review, see Kurdek, 1978) have indicated that a similar
necessary-but-not-sufficient relationship exists between
role-taking ability and moral stages.
A critical contribution has been made by Robert Selman
in his extensive work to complete the theory of a
developmental sequence of social role taking and its
relation to moral development. Selman elaborated on the
development of role taking by employing the open-ended
clinical method used by Piaget and Kohlberg in their
conceptualizations of developmental stages. A brief
description of Selman1s role-taking stages and their
relationship to Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental stages of
moral development are located in Table 3.
Selman describes role-taking as a "form of social
cognition intermediate between logical and moral thought"
(p. 307). With this outlook in mind, he postulates:
. . . the child's cognitive stage indicates his 
level of understanding of physical and logical 
problems, while his role-taking stage indicates 
his level of understanding of the nature of social 
relations; and his moral judgment stage indicates 
the manner in which he decides how to resolve 
social conflicts between people with different 
points of view. Moral judgment considers how 
people should think and act with regard to each 
other, while social role taking considers how and 
why people do in fact think about and act toward 
each other. The stage at which the moral claims 
of self and others are considered, builds on the 
structurally parallel role-taking stage of 
understanding the relationship between the 
perspective of self and others. If the subject
16
TABLE 3
PARALLEL STRUCTURED RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIAL ROLE-TAKINC AND MORAL
JUDGEMENT STAGES*
______ Social Role-Taking Stage_____
Stage 0 - Egocentric Viewpoint
Child has a sense of differentiation 
of self and other but fails to 
distinguish between the social 
perspective (thoughts, feelings) of 
other and self. Child can label 
other's overt feelings but does not 
see the cause and effect relation 
of reasons to social actions.
_______ Moral Judgement S t a g e _______
Stage 0 - Pretnoral Stage
Judgements of right and wrong are 
based on good or bad consequences 
and not on intentions. Moral choices 
derive from the subject's wishes that 
good things happen to self. Child's 
reasons for his choices simply assert 
the choices, rather than attempting 
to justify them._______________________
Stage I - Social-Information 
_____________Role Taking______________
Child is aware that other has a 
social perspective based on other's 
own reasoning, which may or may not 
be similar to child's. However, 
child tends to focus on one 
perspective rather than coordinating 
viewpoints.___________________________
Stage 1 - Punishment and 
Obedience Orientation
Child focuses on one perspective, that 
of the authority or the powerful. 
However, child understands that good 
actions are based on good intentions. 
Beginning sense of fairness as equality 
of acts.
Stage 2 - Self-Reflective 
_____________Role-Taking______________
Child is conscious that each 
individual is aware of the other's 
perspective and that this awareness 
influences self and other's view 
of each other. Putting self in 
other's place is a way of judging 
his intentions, purposes, and 
actions. Child can form a coord­
inated chain of perspectives, but 
cannot yet abstract from this 
process to the level of simultaneous 
mutuality. ____________
Stage 2 - Instrumental Orientation
Moral reciprocity is conceived as the 
equal exchange of the intent of two 
persons in relation to one another.
If someone has a mean intention toward 
self, it is right for self to act in 
kind. Right defined as what is valued 
by self.
Stage 3 - Mutual Role Taking Stage 3 - Orientation to Maintaining 
Mutual Expectations
Child realizes that both self and 
other can view each other mutually 
and simultaneously as subjects. 
Child can step outside the two- 
person dyad and view the inter­
action from a third-person 
perspective.
Right is defined as the Golden Rule:
Do unto others as you would have 
others do unto you. Child considers 
all points of view and reflects on 
each person's motives in an effort to 
reach agreement among all participants.
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(Table 3— continued)
Stage 4 - Social and Conventional 
 ________ System Role-Taking________
Person realizes mutual perspective 
taking does not always lead to 
complete understanding. Social 
conventions are seen as necessary 
because they are understood by all 
members of the group (the 
generalized other) regardless of 
their position, role, or experience.
Stage 4 - Orientation to 
_______ Society's Perspective____________
Right is defined in terms of the 
perspective of the generalized other 
or the majority. Person considers 
consequences of actions for the group 
or society. Orientation to maintenance 
of social morality and social order.
* Source: Selman, 1976
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has not reached a given stage of role taking, he 
cannot apply this stage of social cognition to the 
moral domain.
Selman views role taking not as simply a quantitative 
accumulation of social knowledge, but in terms of 
qualitative changes in the child's structuring of his 
understanding of the relation between the perspective of 
self and others. In his analysis of role taking, Selman 
(1973) examines and considers both structural aspects and 
context. Selman defines structural aspects by the answers 
to the following questions: How do children differentiate
the perspectives of self and other? How do children 
coordinate or relate their perspective to that of another?
In what way are the new differentiation and coordination of 
a given stage based upon, but more advanced than, those of 
the previous stage? Content is defined by the following: 
What are children's conceptions of the subjective aspects of 
self and others? What are their understanding of another's 
capabilities, personality attributes, expectations, emotions 
and social judgments? The definitions found in the context 
questions are closely related to role-taking structure 
"because their own form is particularly defined for the 
child by his structural role-taking stage" (p. 301).
Empirical studies conducted by Selman (1971a; 1971b; 
Selman and Byrne, 1974, Selman and Damon, 1975) were 
typically based on the collection of the Kohlberg moral 
judgment scale and role-taking task measures and 
investigating the relationship between the two measures. In
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a representative study (1971a), Selman administered 
Kohlberg's moral judgment scale, two role-taking tasks (a 
coin and picture game) and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (a measure of conventional intelligence) to 60 middle- 
class children. He defined role-taking skill as "the 
ability to make specific inferences about another's 
capabilities, attributes, expectations, feelings and 
potential reactions" (p. 80). Development of reciprocal 
role-taking ability implies an increasingly accurate 
perception of what another will do in a given situation, and 
specifically, of how one's own actions will affect the 
attitude of another toward one's self. On the basis of this 
definition, subjects were categorized as being either 
reciprocal or non-reciprocal in their role-taking abilities 
on the respective tasks. The subjects who were scored at 
stage 3 and 4 on the moral judgment scale were found to be 
also categorized as reciprocal role-takers. Subjects who 
were low scorers on role-taking ability and moral judgment 
were tested again a year later. No subject in this group 
was found to attain conventional moral judgment without 
reciprocal role-taking ability. However, reciprocal 
role-taking ability was attained by subjects without 
conventional moral judgments. Selman concluded from this 
study that the development of the ability to reciprocally 
role-take is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the development of conventional moral thought.
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Elizabeth Simpson (1976) has proposed a transformation 
from Kohlberg's and Selman's cognitive-developmental view of 
moral development into what she labels a holistic view. She 
refers to this holistic theory of moral development as a 
cognitive-affective-conative developmental theory because it 
attempts to give attention to three aspects of human 
personality: thought, emotion, and motivation. Central to
her theory is the noted relationship between Maslow's (1954) 
hierarchy of needs and Kohlberg's stage structure of moral 
reasoning. He hypothesizes that "individuals who remain 
motivated by unfulfilled psychological needs may not be able 
to function at higher levels of moral development, 
regardless of their stage of cognitive development: and that 
". . . when the satisfaction of these basic needs can be
taken for granted, the person is freed to utilize his 
potential as a human being" (p. 160). Table 4 depicts the 
hypothesized parallels between Maslow's hierarchy of needs 
and Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Although 
Simpson's hypotheses offer theoretical basis for congruence, 
nowhere has the relationship between emotional development 
and cognitive development in the realm of moral development 
been explored or tested empirically.
The empirically based relationships of role-taking 
ability and Piagetian reasoning to moral reasoning and the 
theoretical prescription for a relationship between an 
individual's need system and moral development seem to have 
implications for Kohlberg's moral educational approach (and
2 1
TABLE 4
PARALLELS BETWEEN MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF KOHLBERG*S AND
MASLOW'S THEORIES*
Kohlberg:states of 
motives for moral 
actions
Maslow:Hierarchy 
of needs
1. Fear of Punishment 
by another
1. Physiological needs
2. Desire to manipulate 
goods and obtain 
rewards from another
2. Security needs
3. Anticipation of
approval or disapproval 
by others
3. Belongingness or 
affiliation needs
4. Anticipation of censure 
by legitimate authorities, 
followed by guilt feelings
4. Need for esteem 
from others
5. Concern about respect 
of equals and of the 
community
5. Need for self-esteem 
from sense of compe­
tence
6. Concern about self, 
condemnation
6. Need for self- 
actualization
*Adopted from Simpson, 1976.
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general theory). A consistent finding within moral 
education programs is that there are a number of 
participants who do not benefit from the process (Blatt and 
Kohlberg, 1973; Keasey, 1973). Faust and Artuthnot (1978) 
tested the relationship between Piagetian and moral 
reasoning in the context of moral education programs. They 
found that college students in a moral education program who 
were scored as conventional reasoners and who had reached a 
formal operations level of Piagetian reasoning showed 
significantly greater moral development than those 
individuals with no reasoning discrepancy (concrete and 
conventional reasoners). The previously reported findings 
of an existing necessary but not sufficient relationship 
between concrete reasoning and stage 2 moral reasoning and 
between reciprocal role taking and stage 3 moral reasoning 
seems to be very salient to this line of research. For 
example, if reciprocal role-taking is a prerequisite for 
conventional moral reasoning, then it would be reasonable to 
question the meaningfulness of a moral education program 
unless the participants have the necessary cognitive 
capacities. Furthermore, it could be hypothesized that even 
when a discrepancy of cognitive abilities indicates a 
readiness for movement the level of emotional development of 
that individual could determine whether movement will take 
place. The purpose of the present study is to place these 
questions into a model for research. Specifically, I would 
like to test these hypotheses employing the previously
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discussed Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) study as a model 
for moral education. It was noted earlier that the Turiel 
studies showed a statistically significant upward change by 
introducing a moral dilemma and exposure to a +1 stage of 
moral reasoning. The study by Blatt and Kohlberg takes the 
Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg study one step further by 
applying this principle to a program of moral education. 
Although in the Blatt and Kohlberg study, the conflict and 
exposure take place in the context of continual, intense 
moral discussion between peers in a classroom setting, the 
basic processes of assimilation and movement found in the 
two studies seem to be identical.
According to Kohlberg, the shift from stage 2 to 
stage 3 is marked by the acceptance of the individual that 
the right way is playing the "good" role - being concerned 
about other people and their feelings, and being motivated 
to follow rules and expectations. What is right to stage 3 
reasoners is living up to the expectations of the people 
close to them or what people generally expect of people in 
their role as a son or daughter, friend, etc. (Kohlberg et 
al., 1978). It seems reasonable to propose that the ability 
to take the role of another and the need for affiliation are 
prerequisites for the shift from stage 2 to 3. The stage 3 
reasoners shift from the relation of their actions to their 
instrumental needs (stage 2) to a concern for how others 
will evaluate their actions. Role-taking ability seems to 
be essential for the occurrence of this shift in
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orientation. Stage 3 reasoners take the position of the 
parents or "generalized other" and derive normative values 
(what is expected of the child) as opposed to values derived 
from their instrumental needs (stage 2) or a specific 
external force (stage 1).
Even though individuals may be cognitively ready (i.e., 
role-taking ability) they still have to want to change their 
orientation. Piaget (1981) refers to affect as an 
"energizing" force and cognition as providing the structure 
for this energy. An individual's cognitive structure may be 
"ready" to assimilate stage 3 moral thought but something 
has to initiate the movement. Individuals motivated by a 
need for affiliation would be concerned about what other 
people think of them and would want to live up to the 
expectations of the people close to them. Individuals who 
feel that they live in an insecure and untrustworthy world 
(security need) would be concerned with controlling the 
contingent rewards provided by their environment (stage 2 
orientation) and would not care whether they are liked or 
disliked in the process (for example, an individual in a 
prison system).
Measurement of the need for affiliation would not 
simply involve the assessment of affiliation need 
gratification. According to Maslow's theory of human 
motivation, once a need is fulfilled higher needs 
immediately emerge and these, rather than the fulfilled 
need, dominate the individual. Gratification is just as
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important a concept as deprivation in Maslow's theory. For 
the purpose of this study fulfillment of the security need 
and affiliation need were both assessed. An unfulfilled 
affiliation need would not necessarily indicate that the 
child is motivated at this level. Only when the child's 
security needs are met and his affiliation needs unfulfilled 
could one infer a motivational need state of affiliation.
This study investigates the relationship between the 
movement from a non-reciprocal role-taking level to a 
reciprocal level, and the movement from a pre-conventional 
(stages 1 and 2) to conventional (stages 3 and 4) level of 
moral judgment. In order for children to move from a moral 
stage 2 to a moral stage 3 in the context of moral 
education, it is proposed that they must be able to view an 
interaction from a third-person perspective. It is further 
hypothesized that a reciprocal role-taker at stage 2 moral 
reasoning will need a sufficient degree of affective 
development (high in the need for affiliation) in order to 
make the "primed" shift.
METHODS
Subjects. Subjets were sixty-two fourth grade children 
enrolled in the Williamburg-James City County school system. 
Forty-six students were identified as stage 2 moral 
reasoners during the pretest. The forty-six stage 2 moral 
reasoners consisted of nineteen males and twenty-seven 
females. Eleven of the subjects were black and thirty-five 
were white. Ages ranged from 113 to 132 months with an 
average age of 120 months.
Procedure. The experimental procedure consisted of 
separate or combined sessions in which the subjects were 
assessed on (1) stage of moral reasoning, (2) role-taking 
development, (3) exposure to a series of moral arguments, 
and (4) affiliation and security needs. In addition to the 
experimental sessions IQ scores were obtained from the 
school system records.
The sequence of these tasks was counterbalanced within 
the subject pool except for the requirement that the pretest 
of moral judgment precede the exposure condition. Temporal 
factors between testing were also considered and differences 
were kept at a minimum.
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The pretest of moral judgment involved the 
administration of three hypothetical conflict situations 
from Kohlberg's moral judgment interview (Kohlberg et al., 
1978) (Appendix A). For each of the hypothetical 
situations, Kohlberg and colleagues (1978) have formulated a 
detailed "sentence coding guide" developed on the basis of 
responses in a large subject pool. A subject's responses to 
a given situation were divided into "thought-content" units 
roughly corresponding to sentences. Each unit was 
classified according to aspect and stage. A profile of each 
subject was formed from the percentage of statements given 
at each stage as determined by the scoring guide. The 
subjects were classified in terms of the predominate 
stage(s); the profile of percent usage of each stage yields 
a Moral Maturity Score. The Moral Maturity Score has a 
range from 0 to 600, and one stage is equivalent to 100 
points.
The role-taking measure was adopted from Flavell's 
published studies (1968) of role-taking ability (also 
employed by Selman, 1971a). The role-taking measure focuses 
on children's ability to hold their own perspective 
independent from that of another. In the role-taking task, 
the experimenter introduces a second experimenter to the 
subject and after short conversation the second experimenter 
leaves the room. The first experimenter then presents to 
the subject seven cards (Appendix B) in the following 
sequence:
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Card 1. The boy is walking along the sidewalk, 
whistling and waving a stick.
Card 2. The boy looks frightened and drops his stick 
as he sees a rather ugly looking dog running towards him.
Card 3. The boy runs, looking anxiously over his 
shoulder at the dog, who is in hot pursuit.
Card 4. The boy is shown running with arms 
outstretched toward an apple tree laden with fruit. The dog 
is not shown in the picture.
Card 5. The boy scrambles up the tree, with the dog 
nipping at his heels.
Card 6. The boy is shown standing up in the tree. The 
dog can be seen across the street, trotting away (he looks 
smaller in this picture, and with no visible evidence of 
ferocity). Although the boy's head is partly turned in the 
dog's direction, it shows no particular emotional 
expression.
Card 7. The boy is seated in the tree, munching an 
apple, with the dog nowhere in evidence. After the cards 
were placed on the table, the following instructions were 
given:
"He (E2) has left the room and he won't be 
able to see what we are going to do, will he?
Here is a series of seven pictures which tell a 
story, just like the comics in the newspaper."
The cards are then placed in proper sequence on 
the table. "You tell me what's going on. Begin 
here at the beginning." It the child failed to 
indicate these things in his narration, he was 
asked why the boy climbed the tree and what he was
29
doing in the last picture. "That's fine. Now Mr.
________  hasn't seen any of these pictures. I'm
going to call him back into the room and show him 
just these four pictures (cards 1, 4, 6, and 7).
I want you to pretend you are he and tell the 
story that you think he would tell. Okay (calls 
in E^). Now (speaking to E^) these pictures tell 
a story." E9 then addresses the child and says:
"What story So these pictures tell me?" Again, if 
the child failed to clarify these matters 
spontaneously, in the course of his story, he was 
asked: "Why does he (point to E^) think the boy
climbed the tree?" Or: "What does he think about
that dog there (card 6), what does he think the 
dog is there for?"
The subject's responses were analyzed and scored as 
being either reciprocal or non-reciprocal. Subjects were 
categorized non-reciprocal if they established the dog as 
clearly being the motive for climbing the tree in the four 
card presentation or if the fear of dog motive is not 
mentioned in his narration but is readily supplied during 
the inquiry. Responses are scored as being reciprocal if 
they involve a description saying that the boy is climbing 
the tree in response to a non-fear motive (to get an apple) 
and the dog is said to be irrelevant to the story (just 
walking along).
The exposure condition was adopted directly from the 
Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg study (1969), During this 
session the subjects were given three booklets (Appendix C), 
each containing a conflict situation that had not been used 
in the pretest and four sets of instructions. In each 
booklet, the first set of instructions contains a conflict 
situation from the Kohlberg interview. Following the 
conflict story, a statement will be read implying that the
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character involved in the conflict is having a difficult 
time in reaching a conclusion so he asks a number of friends 
for advice.
The second part of the booklet contains six sets of 
advice on possible solutions to the dilemma: Two are one
stage below the subject's dominant stage (stage 1), two are 
one stage above (stage 3), and two are two stages above 
(stage 4). When possible, the two sets at any given stage 
advocate opposing courses of actions. The expressed advice 
is based on actual responses of subjects derived from the 
Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs, Speicher-Dubin, and Power (19 78) 
coding forms.
The third section of instructions has a set of 
questions aimed at eliciting the subject's preference and 
understanding of the presented advice.
In the fourth section of the booklet, subjects were 
asked what type of advice they would give to the character 
involved in the dilemma. The experimenter read aloud the 
instructions to the subject in order to insure that there is 
no difficulty in reading the material. Subjects were able 
to refer back to original advice statements when answering 
questions except when asked for their own advice.
The subject's "own advice" were scored for stage level. 
In assessing the amount of assimilation, stage usage in the 
pretest interview will be compared with stage usage in the 
subject's "own advice."
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Additionally, subjects pretested as stage 1 
reasoners/non-reciprocal role-takers were placed in the 
exposure condition. Their six sets of advice include two 
stage 1, two stage 2, and two stage 3 (see Appendix D).
These particular subjects were assessed on assimilation in 
order to test the hypotheses that role-taking ability would 
enhance the subject's ability to successfully follow and 
understand the directions to consider six other sets of 
advice.
The need for security was assessed with the children's 
Manifest Anxiety Scale (Casteneda, McCandless, and Palermo, 
1956). Children with higher anxiety scores were 
hypothesized to have a higher security need. A child who 
has an unstructured, unstable environment ( and thus has a 
need for security) should exhibit signs of anxiety. The 
children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (see Appendix E) consists 
of fifty-three items in which children indicate agreement or 
disagreement regarding the applicability of the behavior to 
themselves. Forty-two are anxiety items and eleven refer to 
an L scale that provides an index of the subjects' tendency 
to falsify their responses. The anxiety score is obtained 
by summing the number of anxiety items answered "Yes.” The 
L scale consisted of item numbers 5, 10, 17, 21, 30, 34, 36, 
41, 49, 52. Items 10 and 49, if answered "No," contribute 
to the L scale as do the remaining nine items if answered 
"Yes."
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The test was given on a group basis. The subjects were
divided into three groups (approximately twenty in a group).
The three group tests were given at different intervals
during the general individual testing sessions. The
following instructions were given to each group:
"I am going to ask you some questions. No one but 
myself will see your answers to these questions, 
not your teacher or your principal or your 
parents. These questions are different from other 
questions that you are asked in school. These 
questions are different because there are no right 
or wrong answers. You are to listen to each 
question and then put a circle around either "yes" 
or "no." These questions are about how you think 
and feel and, therefore they have no right or 
wrong answers. People feel and think differently.
The person sitting next to you might put a circle 
around "yes" and you may put a circle around "no."
Now let us start by everybody purring their 
fingers on Number 1. Here is the first question."
Five cards selected from Murray's Thematic Apperception
Test were employed for the assessment of affiliation need
(see Appendix F). THe subjects were individually tested and
given the following instructions:
This is a test of your creative imagination.
Five pictures will be shown to you and you will 
have about five minutes to tell me what you think 
about it. Obviously, there are no right or wrong 
answers, so you may feel free to make up any kind 
of a story about the picture that you choose. The 
more dramatic the better. Try to say as much 
about the picture as you can. Also, try to be as 
imaginative as you can - remember this is a test 
of creative imagination. Do not merely describe 
the picture. Anyone can do that. Make up a story 
about it. While telling your story you should 
answer the following four questions:
1. What is happening? Who are the persons?
2. What has led up to this situation? That 
is, what has happened in the past?
3. What is being thought? What is wanted?
By whom?
4. What will happen? What will be done?
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The cards were always presented in the same order (see 
Appendix F) with each successive card being a more 
"powerful" stimulation of the need for affiliation.
Subject's responses were recorded on audio cassettes.
The responses were scored according to the Heyns,
Veroff and Atkinson Scoring Manual for the affiliation 
motive (1958). Affiliation imagery was scored when the 
story contained some evidence of concern in one or more of 
the characters over establishing, maintaining, or restoring 
a positive affective relationship with another person. This 
relationship can be most adequately described by the word
friendship. The minimum basis for scoring would be that the
relationship of one of the characters in the story to 
someone else is described as friendship (Heyns, Veroff, and 
Atkinson, 1958). Affiliation need scores were based on the 
number of stories (0-5) in which affiliation imagery was 
scored.
The Moral Judgement Interview, role-taking task, 
exposure condition, and TAT were administered by six female 
research assistants. Five assistants were recruited from an 
experimental psychology course and one was a first-year 
graduate student. Each interviewer was trained and 
evaluated by the author before testing began. THe author
administered the group anxiety test.
The author scored all of the administered tests. The 
scorer was unaware of the subject's identity because of a 
coding system employed by the interviewers. Interater
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reliability was established by having a second independent 
rater score the responses of selected protocols of the 
role-taking task, TAT, and the Moral Judgment Interview.
The second rater was a third-year graduate student who was 
familiar with the scoring procedures for the Moral Judgment 
Interview. Interjudge agreement for categorization of 
role-taking ability on- ten randomly selected protocols was 
100%. Interjudge agreement for affiliation imagery (whether 
it was present or not) on 10 randomly selected stories was 
80%. Interater reliability for the moral dilemmas was 
established by having the second rater score the interviews 
of 15 randomly selected subjects. There was 100% agreement 
in the scoring of dominant and minor stages. The interater 
reliability coefficient for the two sets of Moral Maturity 
Scores was .85.
RESULTS
Forty-six out of the sixty-two subjects interviewed
were assessed as stage 2 moral reasoners. Eleven of the
remaining sixteen subjects were stage 1 reasoners with the
remaining five having interviews that were deemed
unscorable. Twenty-six of the stage 2 reasoners were
categorized as reciprocal role-takers; the remaining stage 2
reasoners were categorized as nonreciprocal. A chi-square
analysis was performed on the following pairs: Role-taking
(reciprocal, nonreciprocal) vs Assimilation (assimilators,
nonassimilators) (see Table 5)? Assimilation vs Race (black,
white) (see Table 6); Assimilation vs Sex (male, female)
(see Table 7); Role-taking vs Race (see Table 8);
Role-taking vs Sex (see Table 9). Frequency of assimilation
significantly differed between non-reciprocal and reciprocal
2role-takers. The obtained x =11.944, df=l, was significant 
at the .001 level. The other frequency comparisons were 
non-significant.
The t statistic was employed to test the hypothesis 
that the means for the following comparison groups are equal 
for age, IQ, moral maturity score, and anxiety: 
Non-reciprocal vs. Reciprocal (see Table 10); Non­
assimilating vs assimilating (see Table 11); Black vs White
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TABLE 5
OBSERVED FREQUENCIES AND CHISQUARE STATISTIC
FOR ROLE-TAKING VS ASSIMILATION GROUPS
Reciprocal
Role-takers
Assimilation
Non-assimilation
Non-reciprocal
Role-takers
22 7
4 13
29
17
26 20
STATISTIC
PEARSON CHISQUARE
YATES CORRECTED
CHISQUARE
VALUE
11.944
9.909
D.F
1
PROB. 
.00 05
.0016
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TABLE 6
OBSERVED FREQUENCIES AND CHISQUARE STATISTIC
FOR ASSIMILATION VS RACE GROUPS
Black White
Assimilation
Non-assimilation
8 21
3 14
29
17
11 35
STATISTIC 
PEARSON CHISQUARE
YATES CORRECTED
CHISQUARE
VALUE D.F. PROB.
0.582 1 .4456
0.164 1 .6857
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TABLE 7
OBSERVED FREQUENCIES AND CHISQUARE STATISTIC
FOR ASSIMILATION VS SEX GROUPS
Male Female
Assimilation
Non-assimilation
STATISTIC
YATES CORRECTED
CHISQUARE
14 15
5 12
19 27
VALUE D.F.
E 1.573 1
0.891 1
29
17
PROB.
.2098
.3451
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TABLE 8
OBSERVED FREQENCIES AND CHISQUARE STATISTIC
FOR ROLE-TAKING VS RACE GROUPS
Black White
Reciprocal
Role-takers
Non-reciprocal
Role-takers
9 17
2 18
26
20
11 35
STATISTIC 
PEARSON CHISQUARE
YATES CORRECTED
CHISQUARE
VALUE D.F. PROB.
3.765 1 .0523
2.533 1 .1115
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TABLE 9
OBSERVED FREQUENCIES AND CHISQUARE STATISTIC
FOR ROLE-TAKING VS SEX GROUPS
Male Female
Reciprocal
Role-takers 12 14
Non-reciprocal
Role-takers 7 13
19 27
STATISTIC
PEARSON CHISQUARE
YATES CORRECTED
CHISQUARE
VALUE
0.580
0.211
D.F
1
PROB.
.4463
.6458
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(see Table 12); Male vs Female (see Table 13). Reciprocal 
role-takers were significantly older than the non-reciprocal 
group (t= 2.53, df=44, p .01). The assimilation group was 
significantly older (t= 2.02, df=44, p .05) and higher in 
moral maturity scores (t= 2.51, df=44, p .02) than the 
non-assimilating group. Females showed significantly higher 
anxiety scores than males (t= 3.10, df=40, p .004). All 
other comparisons were nonsignificant at the p .05 alpha 
level. Group means, standard deviations, and frequency 
distributions can also be found in Tables 10, 11, 12, and 
13.
Thirty-nine of the forty-six stage 2 reasoners were 
scored on the need for affiliation (seven sessions were not 
recorded properly). Of the thirty-nine that were scored 
only six were designated as exhibiting a need for 
affiliation, and only one subject from this group was scored 
for the need on more than one story. Five of the six 
affiliation need subjects did assimilate higher reasoning. 
All six were reciprocal role-takers.
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DISCUSSION
The most striking result of this study is the 
relationship between role-taking ability and assimilation of 
stage 3 reasoning. Twenty-two of the twenty-six reciprocal 
role-takers assimilated stage 3 moral reasoning while only 
seven of the twenty non-reciprocal role-takers assimilated 
the higher reasoning. Role-taking ability appears to be a 
powerful predictor of whether the child will assimilate 
stage 3 advice. There are, however, at least three other 
alternate explanations for this result:
1. There could be a .significant IQ difference between 
the assimilation/non-assimilation groups and/or 
reciprocal/non-reciprocal groups.
2. There could be a significant difference in 
pre-tested moral judgment scores between 
reciprocal/non-reciprocal groups.
3. Role-taking ability could be instrumental in the 
ability to understand the assimilation task - for 
example, in order to assimilate higher reasoning, 
the task could require the subject to role-take 
Valjean's perspective and the perspective of the 
characters who give advice.
Although there were no significant differences in IQ 
scores between assimilators and non-assimilators or between 
reciprocal and non-reciprocal role-takers, there was in both 
cases a difference of approximately 7 IQ points (see Tables
46
47
10 and 11). These differences, however, seem to reflect 
several extreme scores and not an over-all group difference.
The pre-tested moral judgment scores of the reciprocal 
and non-reciprocal groups are almost identical (174.9 and 
174.2, respectively). There is a significant difference 
between the moral judgment scores of assimilation and non­
assimilation groups. The subjects that assimilated higher 
reasoning were about 14 points higher than the non- 
assimilators. This difference is a result of the reciprocal 
role-takers/non-assimilators having comparatively low moral 
maturity and the non-reciprocal/assimilators having 
comparatively high scores. Seemingly, if the subject's 
pre-tested level of moral judgment is relatively close to or 
far away from the next highest stage (i.e. stage 3) 
restrictions are placed on the influence of role-taking 
ability as a predictor of assimilation.
The third alternative explanation was addressed by 
giving subjects who were designated stage 1/non-reciprocal 
role-takers the exposure condition booklet (see Procedure 
section; Appendices C and D). If these subjects assimilared 
stage 2 reasoning then reciprocal role-taking ability would 
not be essential for the understanding of the task. Ten 
stage 1/non-reciprocal subjects were given the exposure test 
and five assimilated higher reasoning (stage 2). This seems 
to be a weak disclaimer for the third alternate explanation 
but the procedure is somewhat different for these particular 
subjects. The lowest stage advice was the same as the
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subjects pretested moral reasoning (stage 1) and hence they 
could have been more attracted to the "lower" stage advice 
than the pre-tested stage 2 reasoner.
Even with the preceding reservations, role-taking 
ability does seem to be a predicating factor of stage 3 
assimilation. This portion of the data fits into a growing 
body of research which suggests a dependent relationship 
between cognitive abilities (i.e. Piagetian cognitive 
development and role-taking ability) and the acquisition of 
various stages of moral reasoning (e.g. Faust and Arbuthnot, 
1978; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, and Haan, 1977; Selman, 1975; 
Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey, 1974; Walker and Richards,
19 79; Walker, 1980). Intervention programs which pursue the 
goal of stimulating higher stages of moral reasoning should 
consider the cognitive abilities of the individuals 
involved. An analysis of this type might merit a change in 
the type of approach employed. For example, if the majority 
of your target group's moral reasoning is at the stage 2 
level and role-taking ability at the non-reciprocal level, 
presentation of stage 3 reasoning would probably prove 
fruitless. In this case, the educators should initially 
direct their energy toward the development of the 
participants' role-taking skills. The success of a moral 
education program may depend, in part, on how accurately the 
teacher assesses the participants' cognitive abilities.
The most disappointing aspect of the results is the 
affiliation need data. The hypothesis that, in addition to
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the ability to take a third-person perspective, an 
individual should have a high degree of affiliation need in 
order to shift from an 1 instrumental hedonism" perspective 
to "good person" perspective seems to be untestable because 
of the lack of subjects scored as high in the need for 
affiliation. The inability to analyze this portion of the 
data could be due either to the insensitivity of the 
affiliation assessment task or the possibility that children 
at this age rarely exhibit a need for affiliation. The use 
of a projective test was risky. The scoring of a projective 
test is subjective and complex. Also, lack of enough 
scorable material is an inherent risk of using a projective 
test. In addition to the problems associated with the use 
of projective techniques, four out of the five TAT cards 
originally selected because of their reported sensitivity to 
the affiliation need were banned by the school 
superintendent because he felt that they were inappropriate 
(?!!!). Four less suitable cards were selected.
Certainly, the construction of a task which accurately 
reflects the motivational needs of a child is a major 
obstacle for future attempts in this type of research. I am 
not confident that a researcher can ever capture a picture 
of a child's needs in a one-shot procedure. An individual's 
motivational state is most likely the result of a complex 
interaction between the person and the environment. A 
suitable measure would probably utilize a multivariate 
procedure.
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The results of this study do not directly support
Elizabeth Simpson's hypothesis of a definitive relationship
between Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Kohlberg's states of
moral development. In retrospect I do not feel that an
empirical establishment of inter-theoretical relations is as
important to the understanding of moral development as is
her more central or general proposition that morality is
relative to the needs of the individual's context.
Simpson's perspective merits additional research and is
reflected in recent theoretical and methodological shifts in
moral development research. There has been a noticeable
shift in recent moral development research from an emphasis
on the individual reasoner to the importance of ideological
context and community atmosphere. Kohlberg (1978) recently
pointed out two major directional changes in his research:
First, we have moved from the study of individual 
development to the study of group development (the 
stages and phases in the norms of the group qua 
group). And second, we have passed from a study 
of the internal mental structure of moral 
reasoning to an analysis of something in between: 
group norms and expectations, ethnographically 
defined. . . . Thus we examine behavior not in
terms of individual moral character but in terms 
of the character or the moral atmosphere of a 
group or community, (p. 85)
The beginnings of this shift in orientation can be 
traced to an attempt by Kohlberg and his colleagues to set 
up a moral education program in a Connecticut prison system 
(Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1975). Although inmates 
exhibited tremendous gains in higher stage resolutions to 
the traditional hypothetical dilemmas, it soon became
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apparent that there was a distinct contrast in how real-life 
dilemmas were actually resolved. Real-life dilemmas raised 
by the inmates from their prison experiences were resolved 
with stage 1 or stage 2 reasoning. The prisoners were 
cognitively capable of understanding and producing higher 
reasoning but everyday moral reasoning was based on the 
context of the prison system. Life in prison reflected the 
lowest stages of moral reasoning: a moral system based on
external consequences and a system of reciprocity based on a 
matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." It 
appeared that the morality of the individual acclimated to 
the needs of the environment.
It follows that the successful moral development 
educator or researcher must not only construct an 
individual's cognitive topology but have an understanding of 
the supporting environmental/motivational structure.
Although the present study only supports the need to 
consider cognitive abilities, research concerning the 
relationships between motivational need systems and moral 
development is certainly worth pursuing. Assuredly, there 
are many questions left to be answered.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A 
MORAL JUDGEMENT INTERVIEW
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MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW
Story 1.
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There 
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium 
that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive 
to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost hint to make. 
He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug.
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, 
but he could only get together about $1,000 which Is half of what it cost.
He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper 
or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No,I discovered the drug and 
I'm going to make money from It.” So Heinz got desperate and broke into the 
man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why?
2. Which la worse, letting someone die or stealing? Why?
2a. What does the value of life mean to you, anyway?
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3. Is there a good reason for a husband to steal If he dctsn't love his wife?
4. Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as his wife? Why?
5. Suppose he T7as stealing it for a pet he loved dearly. Would it be right 
to steal for the pet? Why?
6. Heinz steals the drug and is caught. Should the judge sentence him or 
should he let him go free? Why?
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7. The judge thinks of letting him go free. T-Tiat TTould be his reasons for 
doing so?
8. Thinking in terms of society, what would he the best reasons for the judge 
to give him some sentence?
9. Thinking in terms of society, what vrould be the best reasons for the judge 
to not give him some sentence?
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S to ry  2 .
Two young men, b r o t h e r s ,  had g o t t e n  into s e r io u s  t r o u b l e .  They were 
s e c r e t l y  le av ing  tcwn In a hu rry  and needed money. K a r l ,  th e  o l d e r  one, 
broke in t o  a s t o r e  and s t o l e  $500. Bob, the  younger one, went to  a 
r e t i r e d  o ld  man who was known to  h e lp  peop le  in town. Bob t o l d  th e  man 
t h a t  he was very s i c k  and he needed $500 to  pay f o r  th e  o p e r a t io n .  R ea lly  
he w a s n ' t  s i c k  a t  a l l ,  and he had n o in t e n t io n  o f  paying the  man back .  
Although th e  man d i d n ' t  know Bob very w e l l ,  he loaned him the money. So 
Bob and Karl sk ip p ed  town, each w i th  $500.
I.  which would be w o rse ,  s t e a l i n g  l i k e  Karl o r  c h e a t in g  l i k e  Bob? Why?
2 .  Suppose Bob had g o t t e n  the loan from a bank w i th  no i n t e n t i o n  o f
paying i t  back .  Is borrowing from th e  bank o r  th e  o ld  man worse? Why?
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3. t/hat do you fe e l  i s  th e  w o rs t  th in g  about c h e a t in g  the o ld  man?
I*. Uhy s h o u l d n ' t  someone s t e a l  from a s to r e 7
5 .  ’- 'hat is  the  va lue  o r  im portance o f  p ro p e r ty  r i g h t s ?
6 .  l/hich would be worse in terms o f  s o c i e t y ' s  w e l f a r e ,  ch e a t in g  l ik e  
Sob o r  s t e a l i n g  l ik e  Karl? l/hy?
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7. l.'ould your consc ience  fe e l  worse i f  you chea ted  l i k e  Sob o r  s t o l e  
l ik e  K arl?  l/hy?
8. Uhat do people  mean by consc ience?  ' /h a t  do you th in k  o f  as your 
consc ience  and what dees i t  do?
8a. lrnat or who tells you what is right or wrong?
9. Is there anything about your sense of conscience which is special or 
different from that of most people? I/hat?
10. How do people get their consciences? (How did you get or develop a 
conscience?)
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Story 3.
Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. 
His father promised him te could go if he saved uo the money for it 
himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it 
co3t to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was 
going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided 
to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe’s father was 3hort of the money 
it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he saved from the 
paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of 
refusing to give his father the money.
1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?
2. Is there any way in which the father has a right to tell the son to 
give him the money? Why?
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3. What is the most important thing a pood father should recognize in his 
relation to his son? why that?
4. What is the most important thing a good son should recognize in his 
relation to his father? Why that?
5. Why should  a  promise be k ep t?
6. t?hat makes a person feel bad if a promise is broken?
7. Why is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well 
or are not close to?
APPENDIX B 
ROLE TAKING TASK CARDS
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APPENDIX C 
EXPOSURE CONDITION BOOKLETS
Jud y  was a t w e l v e - y e a r - o l d  g i r l .  She had  s a v e d  up from  b a b y s i t t i n g  and 
lunch  money f o r  a lo ng  t im e  s o  sh e  w ou ld  have  enough  money t o  b u y  a  t i c k e t  
to  a s p e c i a l  o u t - o f - t o w n  ro c k  c o n c e r t  t h a t  was coming to  h e r  tow n. She had 
managed to  s a v e  up th e  $5 t h e  t i c k e t  c o s t  p l u s  a n o t h e r  $3 . H er m o th e r  had 
p ro m ise d  h e r . t h a t  s h e  c o u l d  go t o  th e  ro c k  c o n c e r t  i f  sh e  s a v e d  t h e  money 
h e r s e l f .  L a t e r  h e r  m o th e r  ch an g ed  h e r  mind and t o l d  Judy  t h a t  s h e  h ad  to  
sp end  t h e  money on new c l o t h e s  f o r  s c h o o l .  Judy  was d i s a p p o i n t e d ,  and  d e c id e d  
t o  go t o  t h e  c o n c e r t  anyway. She b o u g h t  a t i c k e t  and t o l d  h e r  m o th e r  t h a t  she  
had o n ly  been a b l e  t o  s a v e  $ 3 .  T h a t  S a tu r d a y  she  w en t  t o  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  and 
t o l d  h e r  m o the r  t h a t  s h e  was s p e n d i n g  t h e  day w i t h  a  f r i e n d .  A week p a s s e d  
w i t h o u t  h e r  m o th e r  f i n d i n g  o u t .  Jud y  th e n  t o l d  h e r  o l d e r  s i s t e r ,  L o u i s e ,  t h a t  
sh e  had gone t o  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  and  had  l i e d  to  h e r  m o th e r  a b o u t  i t .
L o u i s e ,  th e  o l d e r  s i s t e r ,  i s  n o t  s u r e  w hat t o  do in  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a ­
t i o n .  She d o e s n ' t  know i f  sh e  s h o u l d  t e l l  t h e i r  m o th e r  t h a t  Ju d y  had  l i e d  a b o u t  
t h e  money o r  j u s t  keep  q u i e t  a b o u t  i t .  So L o u ise  w en t  t o  some o f  h e r  f r i e n d s  
and a s k e d  them f o r  a d v i c e .  L i s t e d  on th e  n e x t  page  a r e  t h e  names o f  t h e  s i x  
f r i e n d s  L ou ise  w en t  t o  and  n e x t  t o  e ach  name you w i l l  f i n d  t h e  a d v ic e  g iv en  
by t h a t  f r i e n d .
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Mary. You s h o u ld  t e l l  b e f o r e  y o u r  m other  f i n d s  o u t  on h e r  own. I f  
y o u r  m other  f i n d s  o u t  you knew ab o u t  i t  she  would be bad on you ,  to o .
D en ise .  You sh o u ld  t e l l  y o u r  m other  ab o u t  J u d y l s l i e  b ec a u se  i f  you 
d o n ‘ t  you would be l y in g  t o  y o u r  m other  and then  you co u ld  g e t  in t r o u b l e ,  to o .
Anne. I t h i n k  i f  y o u r  m other  i s  u n d e r s ta n d in g  you s h o u ld  t e l l .  I f  your 
m other  i s  n o t  u n d e r s t a n d in g  th e n  you sh o u ld  ta k e  up th e  m a t t e r  w i th  y o u r  s i s t e r  
y o u r s e I f .
C athy. I d o n ' t  t h i n k  you s h o u ld  t e l l  b ecau se  i t  w ould w reck y o u r  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  w i th  y ou r  s i s t e r  and w ould  s p o i l  t h e  c o n f id e n c e ,  which Judy  t r u s t e d  in you.
D ebbie .  You s h o u l d n ' t  t e l l  on Judy  beca u se  i t ' s  im p o r t a n t  to  be t r u s tw o r t h y  
and b ecau se  J u d y ' s  c h a r a c t e r  i s  fo rm ing .  You s h o u ld  be as r e l i a b l e  as p o s s i b l e  
b eca u se  p e o p le  a r e  remembered f o r  t h i s .
B e tsy .  You sh o u ld  t e l l  b e c a u se  Judy i s  t e l l i n g  a l i e  h e re  and a l s o  i t  shows 
a la ck  o f  r e s p e c t  f o r  h e r  m o t h e r ' s  a u t h o r i t y  and t h a t  i s  a l s o  wrong.
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I . Would you choose th e  two f r i e n d s  whom you th in k  have g iven  th e  b e s t  
advi cc?
l a .  Can you say  why you have chosen th e s e ?
2 .  (low choose th e  two f r i e n d s  whom you th i n k  have q iven the  w o rs t  a d v ic e .
2 a .  Why d id  you p ic k  th e s e ?
3 .  Vihi ch one o f  th e  f r i e n d s  do you th i n k  is  th e  s m a r te s t  person?
3 a .  Why?
U. Which one o f  th e  f r i e n d s  do you th in k  i s  th e  "most good" p e rso n ?
k a .  l i n y ?
71
/
i . .  Suppose you were one o f  L o u i s e ' s  f r i e n d s  and she came t o  you fo r  
a d v i c e .  What would you t e l l  h e r  t o  do? Why?
In a c o u n t r y  i n  E u rope ,  a  poo r  man named V a l j e a n  c ou ld  f i n d  no work,  n o r  
c o u l d  h i s  s i s t e r  and b r o t h e r .  Wi t ho u t  money,  he s t o l e  food and med i c in e  t h a t  
t h ey  nee d ed .  He was c a p t u r e d  and s e n t e n c e d  t o  p r i s o n  f o r  s i x  y e a r s .  A f t e r  a 
c o u p l e  o f  y e a r s ,  he e s c a p e d  from t h e  p r i s o n  and w en t  t o  l i v e  in  a n o t h e r  p a r t  
o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  u n de r  a new name.  He s a v e d  money and  s l o w l y  b u i l t  up a b ig  
f a c t o r y .  He gave h i s  w or k e r s  t h e  h i g h e s t  wages  and u sed  most  o f  h i s  p r o f i t s  
t o  b u i l d  a h o s p i t a l  f o r  p e o p l e  who c o u l d n ' t  a f f o r d  good med ica l  c a r e .  Twenty 
y e a r s  had p a s s e d  when a t a i l o r  r e c o g n i z e d  t h e  f a c t o r y  owner as  b e in g  V a l j e a n ,  
t h e  e s c a p e d  c o n v i c t  whom th e  p o l i c e  had been  l o o k i n g  f o r  back  in h i s  home town.
The t a i l o r  i s  n o t  s u r e  wha t  t o  do i n  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n .  He d o e s n ' t
know i f  he sh ou ld  r e p o r t  V a l j e a n  t o  t h e  p o l i c e  o r  n o t .  So t h e  t a t i o r  went  t o  
some o f  h i s  f r i e n d s  and a sked  them f o r  a d v i c e .  L i s t e d  on t h e  n e x t  page a r e  t h e  
names o f  t h e  s i x  f r i e n d s  t he  t a i l o r  wen t  t o  and n e x t  t o  e ach  name you w i l l  f i n d
t h e  a d v i c e  g iven  by t h a t  f r i e n d .
B e r t .  You sh o u l d  r e p o r t  him beca use  o th e r w i s e  you would be as  g u i l t ,  
Va.Ijean and when t h e  cops  f i n d  o u t  they  w i l l  p u t  you in j a i l ,  t o o .  I f  you 
d o n ' t  r e p o r t  c o n v i c t s  t h en  t h ey  w i l l  t ak e  you t o  c o u r t .
C h a r l i e .  I t h i n k  you sh o u l d  r e p o r t  Va l j e an  t o  t he  p o l i c e  beca use  he s t o l e  
and he b ro ke  ou t  o f  j a i l .  C onv i c t s  a r e  dangerous  and you s h o u l d n ' t  f oo l  around 
w i t h  them.
Tom. I t  i s  y o u r  du ty  as  a good c i t i z e n  t o  r e p o r t  Va l je an  becau se  he has 
done som e th in g  wrong.  Pe op l e  who a r e n ' t  good c i t i z e n s  d o n ' t  c a r e  abou t  t h e i r  
c i t y  and t h ey  n e v e r  r e p o r t  a n y t h i n g  t h a t  i s  wrong.
B i l l .  You s h o u i d n ’ t  t e l l  t h e  p o l i c e  because  b e f o r e  Va l je an  s t o l e  he had 
t r i e d  e v e r y t h i n g  and he  c o u l d n ' t  f i n d  a j o b .  I r e a l l y  d o n ' t  t h i n k  i t  was r i g h t  
t o  p u t  him in j a i l  in t he  f i r s t  p l a c e .
David.  You s h o u l d n ' t  r e p o r t  Va l j e an  be cause  he would be s e n t  t o  p r i s o n  and 
p r i s o n  s e r v e s  t o  p r o t e c t  s o c i e t y .  S o c i e t y  would be h u r t  more t han  h e lp e d  by 
s en d i ng  V a l j e an  t o  j a i l .
Andy. You s h o u l d  r e p o r t  him because  you have a r i g h t  as a c i t i z e n  and 
member o f  s o c i e t y  t o  upho ld  t h e  laws.  You s h o u l d n ' t  t ake  t h e  law i n t o  your  w n  
h a n d s .
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i .  Would you choose t he  two f r i e n d s  whom you t h i n k  have g iven t he  b e s t  
advi  cc?
l a .  Can you say  why you have chosen t he se ?
2 .  How choose t h e  two f r i e n d s  whom you t h i n k  have g iven  the  w or s t  a d v i c e .
2 a .  Why d id  you p i c k  t he s e?
3 .  Which one o f  t h e  f r i e n d s  do you t h i n k  i s  t h e  s m a r t e s t  pe rson?
3a.  Why?
U. Which one o f  t h e  f r i e n d s  do you t h i n k  i s  t h e  "most  good" pe r son?
Aa. Why?
I.
advi  c e .
Suppose you were one o f  t h e  t a i l o r s  f r i e n d s  and he  came t o  you f o r  
l /hat  would you t e l l  him t o  do? Why?
The t a i l o r  was s t i l l  r e a l l y  ha v in g  t r o u b l e  d e c i d i n g  w h e th e r  t o  t u r n  Va l j e an  in 
o r  n o t .  He c o u l d n ' t  t h i n k  o f  wha t  would happen t o  V a l j e a n  i f  he d id  t u r n  him in .
So t h e  t a i l o r  wen t  t o  s i x  o t h e r  f r i e n d s  and a sked  them w h a t  t hey  t h ou g h t  would happen.  
L i s t e d  on t h e  n e x t  page a r e  t h e  names o f  t h e  s i x  f r i e n d s  t h e  t a i l o r  wen t  t o  and nex t  
t o  e a ch  name you w i l l  f i n d  what  e a ch  f r i e n d  s a i d .
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Gary.  He should  be s e n t  back t o  j a i l  b ecause  he on ly  took two y e a r s .  That  
ve ry  bad and i t  i s  even wor se  beca use  he e s cap ed  and p ro b ab l y  d id  damage t o  t h e  p r i s o n . .
S t e v e .  The j udge  gave him a s i x  y e a r  s e n t e n c e  and t h e  j u dg e  must  be obeyed.
You should  always do what  t he  j u dg e  t e l l s  you t o  do,  so  V a l j e a n  shou ld  go back  t o  j a i l .
J im.  He s h o u l d n ' t  be s e n t  back t o  j a i 1 be cause  V a l j e a n  worked more f o r  o t h e r  
p eo p l e  t han  f o r  h i m s e l f .  He d i d n ' t  h u r t  anyone bu t  h e l p e d  them. All  he want ed  was 
t o  make a good l i f e  f o r  h i m s e l f .
Hark.  Va l j e an  i s  h e l p i n g  p eo p l e  and i s  a good p e r s on  so  t h e  j u dge  would  no t  
send  him back t o  j a i l .  He j u s t  s t o l e  t o  h e lp  h i s  f am i l y  in, t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .
Ken. V a l j e an  s h o u l d n ' t  be s e n t  back t o  j a i l  b ecau se  he i s  a p o s i t i v e  member 
o f  s o c i e t y .  He was c o n v i c t e d  o f  c o u r s e ,  but  t hey can commute s e n t e n c e s  o f  peop l e  who 
a r e  r e fo rmed.
k i c k .  You should  s end  V a l j e an  back t o  j a i l  t o  s a t i s f y  t he  s t r i c t  l e ga l  code 
t h a t  g u a ra n t e e s  o r d e r  in s o c i e t y .  I t  would be a wa r n ing  t o  f u t u r e  p o t e n t i a l  t h e i v e s .
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I . Would you choose  t he  two f r i e n d s  whom you t h i n k  have g iven  the be s t  
advi  cc?
l a .  Can you s ay  why you have chosen t he se?
2 .  How choose t h e  two f r i e n d s  whom you t h i n k  have g iven  t h e  w o r s t  adv i ce .
2 a .  Why d id  you p i c k  t he s e ?
3 .  Which one o f  t h e  f r i e n d s  do you t h i n k  i s  t h e  s m a r t e s t  pe r son?
3a.  Why?
k s Which one o f  t h e  f r i e n d s  do you t h in k  I s  t h e  "most  good" pe r son?
ka.  Why?
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I .  Suppose you were one o f  t he  t a i l o r ' s  f r i e n d s  and he a sked  you what  you 
t hough t  shou ld  happen t o  Va l j ean  i f  he t u rned  him in .  Ifhat would you t e l l  him? 
Why?
APPENDIX D
STAGE 2 ADVICE USED IN THE 
EXPOSURE CONDITION BOOKLET
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Story 1
Debbie. It is none of your business to tell your mother that Judy went 
to the concert. Judy saved the money and should be able to spend it the way 
she wants.
Betsy. You should tell because Judy might start doing this all the time. 
If she gets away with it once, she might start doing it all the time.
Story 2
David. You could get yourself into a situation like that sane day and 
Valjean might help him out by keeping quiet so it would be best for you not 
to report.
Andy. Valjean stole those things and should pay for than. Whoever 
saw the convict should report him.
Story 3
Ken. It's none of your business, he is not caimitting crimes now, he 
is not doing any harm to you or your business.
Rick. You should follow the law if everyone else was going to know 
about it. It wouldn't do anything but start other troubles.
APPENDIX E 
THE CHILDREN MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE
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Name
1. It is bard for me to keen my mind on anything. Ves no
2. I get nervous when someone ratches me work. kes No
3. I feel I have to be best in everything. yes Mo
4. I blusb easily. ,'res Mo
5. I like everyone T know. Yes No
6. I notice mv heart beats very fast sometimes. Ves No
7. At tires I feel like shouting. ves 'To
p. I wish I could be very far fran here. ves No
°. others seer to do things easier than t can. ves No
10. I would rather win than lose in a game. ves 'To
11. I am secretly afraid of a. lot of things. ves -To
12. I feel that others do not like the ”>av I do ves No
things.
13. I feel alone even when there are necnle around yes No
m e .
14. I have troulble making un my mind . yes No
15. I get nervous T->hen things do not go tbe right ves No
w v  for me.
16. I worry most of the time. 7es No
17. I am al’"avs kind. ves No
13. I worry about what my parents T'dll say to me. ves No
1°. Often I have trouble getting my breath. M°
20. I get angry easily.
21. I always have good manners.
22. r*y hands feel sweaty.
Ves No
Ves ,To
Ves No
ves No23. I b»ve to go to the bathroan more than most 
neonle.
24. Other children are more hanpier than T. Ves '-°
25. I woory about what other neorle think about me. ves No
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26. I have trouble swallot’dnp. ves No
27. I have worried about things that did not really Ves TTo
make anv difference later.
28. Tty feelings pet hurt easil^. ,res No
2Q. Ivorry about doing the ripht thlnps. yes TTo
-r)* ^ am always good. VeR M°
31. I worry about what is going to haonen. Ves No
32. It Is hard for me to mo to sleer at nlpht. Ves No
33. I worry about how ’-'ell I am dolnp In school. Ves No
3^ . I am al'^ pvs nice to everyone. Ves No
35. feellnps pet hurt easily when I am scolded. yes No
36. I tell the truth every single time. Ves No
37. I often pet lonesome when I am vlth neoole. ves ’To
38. I feel someone vrill tell me I do thinps the ves 'To
vrrcng way.
39. I am afraid of the dar^. ves No
40. It Is hard for me to keen my mind on mv ves No
school Tt,ork.
41. I never pet anprv. ves yo
42. Often I feel sick in mv stomach. yes n0
43. I worry when I go to bed. at night. ves No
44. I often do thinps I wish I had never done. Yes ’T0
45. I pet headaches. yes '7o
46. I often ’"orrv about what could barren to my ves No
parents.
47. I never say thinps I shouldn't. yes fTo
48. I pet tired easilv. yes No
49. It is pood to pet high grades In school. Ves ,To
50. I have bad dreams ves *To
51. I am nervous. Ypf5
52. I never lie. v<?s No
53. I often worry about something bad harnening to me. ves No
APPENDIX F 
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